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COMMENTARY ON "MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING
RULES": THE LIMITATIONS OF A STRICTLY
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Theodore J St. Antoine*
L ABOR law bulks large on the docket of the United States Supreme
Court.' Yet never would I have included Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Service, Inc. v. NLRB,2 dealing with the seemingly mundane issue of an
employer's right to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining, in the select
company of cases addressing such pulse-quickening subjects as affirmative
action, picketing as free speech, and union antitrust liability. Professor
Douglas Leslie's elegant and provocative article shows just how wrong I
was--or at least just how far imaginative analysis can go toward seeing a
world in a grain of sand.
I lay no claim to expertise as a labor economist, and, therefore, I do not
attempt a systematic critique of Leslie's article. Instead, my remarks will
touch upon two rather discrete areas about which Leslie has stimulated my
thinking. First, I shall make some "fly-specking" observations on a few of
Leslie's specific points, with my purpose usually being to seek clarification or
further explanation. Second, I will underscore the noneconomic aspects of a
labor union's nature and purposes and suggest that there are inherent limita-
tions to any strictly economic analysis of such an organization's behavior.
I. SEEKING CLARIFICATION AND EXPLANATIONS
At the outset, I doff my cap to Leslie on his discussion of the Coase Theo-
rem. A gifted teacher has demonstrated how effectively this somewhat
abstruse concept can be communicated to a lay audience. But the applicabil-
ity of the Coase Theorem depends on the absence of any substantial transac-
tions costs, and Leslie's unverified "'hunch'" is that "there are serious
transactions costs in labor-management gap-filling."3 If serious transactions
costs exist, Leslie's otherwise laudable exposition of the Coasian framework
*James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
I During the Burger years, for example, the Court averaged a dozen noteworthy labor
decisions a term, according to my calculations.
2 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
3 For a different view that there are no substantial transactions costs in labor-management
bargaining, see Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Thebrem, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 245
(1987).
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may become, according to his own analysis, a monumental irrelevancy with
respect to Bonanno.
Leslie objects to the Supreme Court's reliance on the promotion of "indus-
trial peace" as a basis for the Bonanno decision, arguing that this notion is
"too amorphous to be of use." He adds that the phrase "suggests a black-
mail-based explanation for the passage of the Wagner Act."4 Beyond that,
he contends that even agreement on the meaning of "industrial peace" and
its acceptance as a policy goal does not aid a determination of whether we
ought to foster multiemployer bargaining. I agree that "industrial peace" is
hardly a definitive criterion. It is not, however, devoid of all meaning or
utility, especially if we substitute the wording, "stability of labor relations."
Interpreting the goal in this manner would appear to support the mainte-
nance of a multiemployer unit. Moreover, even if we resort to the more
crass terminology of "avoidance of labor unrest," the plain fact is that this
was a major objective of the principal proponents of the Wagner Act, along
with the nobler aims of "social justice" and economic prosperity.5 Leslie
may or may not be right about the deficiencies of "industrial peace" as a
standard, but he gains little or nothing by denigrating it as "blackmail-
based."
More substantively, Leslie's proposed alternative approaches to Bonanno
leave me with mixed feelings. His analysis of union and management
motives and behavior before, during, and after multiemployer bargaining is
more subtle and more sophisticated than anything in the various opinions in
Bonanno. Yet, when he finishes, what do we have? We learn a great deal
about the competing merits of "precise" rules and "multifactored" rules, but
we get scant enlightenment about which type-let alone what particular
rule-should have been applied in Bonanno. Leslie, of course, can respond
that he did not intend to provide the answers; he only sought to identify the
questions that have to be addressed. For me, however, this whole exercise
takes place at such a level of abstraction and is so inconclusive that eventu-
ally it is hard not to generate some doubts about the value of the enterprise.
I remain convinced that economic analysis has much to tell us about the way
that we should regulate labor relations. But there are times when I want to
importune Leslie to go out and ask a few union and management representa-
tives about what really happens in multiemployer bargaining.
4 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
5 78 Cong. Rec. 3443, 10,351-52, 10,559 (1934) (statements of Sens. Wagner & Walsh).
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II. ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC ASPECTS OF UNION ACTrvIrY
Leslie observes that the unions' claims that they "seek to take the wages
out of competition" is "puzzling" to the point of disbelief to the economist.
That might be true for the economist whose province is the traditional pro-
duct market in goods and services, but it should not be true for the econo-
mist specializing in the labor market. In classical trade union theory, the
quintessential objective is to organize every industry in its entirety and to
eradicate all wage competition among those performing the same task in any
industry.6 Thus, workers standing together will be able to thwart the efforts
of employers to divide and conquer. Indeed, in the famous case of Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader,7 the Supreme Court acknowledged, through Justice
Stone's opinion for the Court, that the very touchstone for labor antitrust
immunity is the Sherman Act's' inapplicability to "an elimination of price
competition based on differences in labor standards."9 Taking wages "out of
competition" and thus eliminating "differences in labor standards" begins,
naturally, with the formation of a labor union and the initiation of collective
bargaining with a single employer. At least with respect to employees in the
same job classification, one of the main goals of the union is to obtain uni-
formity of compensation. Leslie should hardly be puzzled that unions there-
fore seek to eliminate wage competition. Recent empirical studies
demonstrate that the overall effect of unionism in this country has been
to reduce wage disparity across the employment spectrum. ° There are con-
cededly some union monopoly effects, but the "leveling" effects
predominate."
Although the total economic impact of unionism is much debated, the
conventional wisdom of the labor economists is that unions in the United
States cannot be proven to have effectuated any long-term shift in the distri-
bution of corporate income in favor of the wage-earning class.12 Economist
Albert Rees, who estimates that unions may have succeeded in raising the
6 See, e.g., E.W. Bakke, Mutual Survival: The Goal of Unions and Management 3-18
(1946); S. Webb & B. Webb, Industrial Democracy 173-79 (2d ed. 1920).
7 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
8 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
9 Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 495, 503.04.
10 R. Freeman & J. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 90-93 (1984) (citations omitted)
(concluding that "it appears that trade unionism in the United States reduces wage inequality
by about 3 percent").
11 See id. at 93.
12 See D. Bok & J. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 284-89, 463-65 (1970).
For early statistics supporting this phenomenon, see generally P. Douglas, Real Wages in the
United States 1890-1926, at 562-64 (1930) ("The evidence seems to indicate that when labor
organization becomes effective, it yields very appreciable results in its early stages, but that
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wage rates of their members an average of fifteen to twenty percent in recent
years,' 3 concludes that wage increases may result in employers' installation
of more efficient productive processes that require fewer workers. 14 For
Rees and others like him, the ultimate justification for organized labor and
collective bargaining is not economic at all. It lies instead in the "protection
against the abuse of managerial authority given by seniority systems and
grievance procedures" and the "organized representation in public affairs
given the worker by the political activities of unions."' 5
The composition of unions, as well as their goals and actual impact, bears
on multiemployer bargaining in several ways. First, an examination of
unions helps to explain why they are willing to participate in multiemployer
bargaining. Both philosophically and pragmatically, a system that ensures
uniformity of treatment in compensation, grievance handling, and so forth,
should strongly appeal to an institution whose members (and therefore
whose leaders) prize equality and stability in employment. This emphasis on
reduction of wage envy, even at the expense of a maximum wage, would tend
to confirm the validity of Leslie's "relational contract" model or "relative
wage" theory, as distinguished from the monopolist "wage premium" the-
ory. Freeman and Medoff's empirical data are in accord with this assump-
tion.'6 Even if union negotiators could wring a better settlement from a
peculiarly vulnerable (or peculiarly affluent) employer than from the rest of
a group of unionized competitors, internal political considerations might
well militate against it. The favored employees would view their superior
contract terms as no more than their due; their less fortunate brethren, how-
ever, would likely feel betrayed and outraged. Union officers could expect to
confront the wrath of the latter at the next election. Multiemployer bargain-
ing avoids those problems. Thus, the explanation for the unions' acceptance
of it may, in certain circumstances, be less a matter of economic theory than
of eminently practical union politics.
thereafter the rate of gain enjoyed by its members tends to slow down to a speed which does
not appreciably exceed that of the non-union industries.").
13 A. Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions 74 (2d ed. 1977).
14 Id. at 89-90. Because of employers substituting capital for labor over a period of time,
Rees suggests that it is therefore "entirely possible for a union simultaneously to raise the
relative wages of its members and to reduce their aggregate share of income arising in their
industry." Id. at 90.
15 Id. at 186-87 (discussing the external political affairs of unions); cf. St. Antoine, Dispute
Resolution between the General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers,
1970-1982 (discussing how internal politics of unions "cannot be underestimated"), in
Industrial Conflict Resolution in Market Economies 299, 315 (T. Hanami & R. Blanpain eds.
1984).
16 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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From my armchair perspective, the advantages that management finds in
multiemployer bargaining are less clear. A few employers may somehow
recognize or intuit the economists' conclusion that unionization has rela-
tively little effect on the total wage package anyway and, therefore, that the
battle is not worth fighting. In any event, joint negotiations would seem to
provide some obvious benefits for the smaller, intensely competitive busi-
nesses-laundries and dry cleaners, building contractors, trucking firms, and
so forth-that comprise the typical multiemployer unit. The time and
expense of collective bargaining, the use of lawyers and other experts, and
even personnel experiences can all be shared. In addition, a group of
employers can share the administration and costs of such increasingly
important employee fringes as welfare and pension plans. Standardization of
contract terms is also convenient in industries like construction, longshoring,
and shipping, where employees periodically rotate from one firm to another.
Finally, any struggling, risk-averse proprietor must surely take solace in
knowing that workers' wages and conditions constitute at least one area
immune from competition by a rival down the street.
III. CONCLUSION
I have this image of Justice White. He has been burning the midnight oil
and looks haggard and disheveled. The deadline for his first draft in
Bonanno is two weeks past, he is still wrestling with the idea of "industrial
peace," and he hasn't even touched the dozen other cases to which he has
been assigned to write the opinions. He turns to Leslie.
"Professor," he says, "I need help. You have been sitting.here in this
tranquil university town, thinking for months about an employer's right to
withdraw from multiemployer bargaining. You know more about the sub-
ject than anyone else in the country. What should I do?"
"Well, Mr. Justice," replies Leslie (they still say "Mr." at Mr. Jefferson's
University), "economic analysis of multiemployer bargaining is 'devilishly
difficult.' Even if we were certain about the welfare effects, 'the choice of a
standard would not necessarily be dictated.' But at least the 'appropriate
questions' are clear to me."
An anguished look crosses White's face. He stumbles off, muttering under
his breath, "I guess 'industrial peace' will have to do. .. "
Come on now, Leslie! You have almost written yourself a little master-
piece. Push yourself to a conclusion.
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